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President Trump has succinctly described the Middle East as a ‘troubled 
place’, a region ‘whose fate lies in the hands of its own people’, and where American 
vital interests are narrowly defined (Indyk 2018). US vital interests there, namely, fail 
to comprise the overthrow of dictators, be they Assad or Sisi, or stability through 
peace by bringing about an end to bloody civil and proxy wars as in Syria and Yem-
en. They mostly seem to revolve around US-defined key security threats: terrorism 
and the proliferation of WMD. The attitude by Trump has been described as the 
vindication of former President Obama ‘leading from behind’ approach that 
aroused so much criticism at the time of the intervention in Libya in 2011, in primis 
by Trump (Indyk 2018).  
American foreign policy under President Trump in the Middle East and 
North Africa has been a policy rollercoaster, sometimes in line of continuity with 
policies adopted by the previous administration, sometimes with violent breaks 
from the past, sometimes apparently brought about by material interest calculations, 
other times supposedly driven by personal politics and symbolic gestures. All this 
has happened without a clearcut grand strategy, but rather though ad hoc decisions 
and policy U-turns, and, in bureaucratic politics’ terms, with different parts of the 
administration contradicting one another, notably State Department and the White 
House.  
In May 2017, despite Trump’s declaratory policy on the US disengagement 
from the region, the President’s first destination as a foreign trip was Saudi Arabia. 
The media coverage initially insisted on the extremely good chemistry between 
Crown Prince Bin Salman and President Trump, later delving into the narrative by 
both sides of an extremely fruitful meeting, which reinforced the US-Saudi alliance 
for Riyadh on the international stage and which was held by Trump as an economic 
success in terms of new trade deals signed. The visibility, enhanced status and pres-
tige enjoyed by the Saudi monarchy, also thanks to the shared vision of the region, 
emboldened the Saudi and Emirati leadership who declared a blockade against Qa-
tar. While President Trump seemed reluctant to condemn the unilateral move by 
the two Gulf countries against another Sunni Gulf country, fellow member of the 
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Gulf Cooperation Council, under the insistence of then Secretary of state Tillerson, 
the US timidly tried to push the two sides to negotiate, without any success 
(Wintour 2017).  
The biggest reversal of previous policies has notoriously been on Iran, 
where the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed by Iran 
and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
plus Germany) has been unilaterally decertified by Washington in October 2017. 
On the now defunct Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), President Trump 
has discursively stood by a two-state solution and the importance of a diplomatic 
way out, but on the ground the US Embassy has been moved from Tel Aviv to Je-
rusalem in May 2018, in a unilateral move which was decided despite the lack of ne-
gotiations or any promise by Israel of restarting them. After increasingly strained re-
lations between the Obama administration and the Netanyahu government, at least 
since 2012, Trump has emboldened the Israeli government and has legitimized 
more belligerent stances vis-à-vis the Palestinians (Entous 2018). 
On Syria, after the fall of Raqqa and the weakening of the Islamic State, as 
a consequence of years of military engagement by an international coalition created 
by former President Barak Obama, Trump has taken the merit for this and has fo-
cused attention on the country’s stabilization in the medium term, de facto accepting 
the physical and political survival of President Assad and the continuing role of 
Russia, acknowledged as kingmaker of the country’s future.  
In North Africa, US diplomacy has rewarded a military dictatorship and its 
authoritarian leader, bestowing upon President Sisi the aura of a grand leader, while 
funds for democracy assistance earmarked for Tunisia have been diminished (Miller 
& Ruffner 2018). In Libya, the Trump administration has not steered away from the 
Obama ‘leading from behind’ approach and has limited itself to targeted airstrikes 
against ISIS, refraining from playing any role in favoring an agreement between the 
Government of National Accord (GNA) in the west and the House of Representa-
tives (HOR) based in Tobruk and its ally General Khalifa Haftar in the east (Mezran 
2017). 
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Given the seemingly chaotic, ad hoc, arbitrary individual decisions taken by 
the White House on Middle Eastern affairs, expectations that the new US National 
Security Strategy (NSS) would have shed light on the future approach and would 
have spelled out a definition of threats, interests and ensuing US policies, were mis-
placed. In December 2017, a new US NSS was adopted, which contained many ref-
erences to the MENA region and how the US should best deal with that ‘troubled 
place’. The 2017 NSS has coined ‘principled realism’ as framework of reference for 
US foreign policy, emphasizing the coherence between Trump’s catch all slogan, 
Make America Great Again, and ‘America First’, a zero-sum foreign policy, imping-
ing on multilateral cooperation. Despite sounding a realist recipe enhancing disen-
gagement and the reduction of costs and risks, it falls short of calling for a full-
fledged realist offshore balancing option. This would represent today the most co-
herent realist approach for US foreign policy. In order for the US to remain the on-
ly great power in the Western hemisphere, Washington would get involved only in 
three areas, Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf, three regions of key im-
portance in the global balance of power. In each of these regions it would try to 
avoid the emergence of a regional hegemon or of another great power dominating 
regional politics (Walt 2018). In the Middle East, offshore balancing would mean 
burden-sharing among regional players in terms of providing for security, avoid get-
ting bogged down in regional conflicts, rivalries and in sectarian dynamics. The ra-
tionale for foreign policy behavior would be balance of power, rather than ideology, 
mercantilism, promotion of values, arbitrary intervention aimed at regime change.  
Differently from that, in the 2017 NSS formulation, ‘principled realism’ 
foresees various forms and shapes of ‘competitive engagement’, in those circum-
stances where the US primacy needs allies to maintain or promote its interests. The 
NSS is articulated around four pillars: protect America homeland, citizens and way 
of life; promote American prosperity; preserve peace through strength; and advance 
US influence worldwide. The transactional approach, whereby the US must be 
compensated for what it has contributed to the international system or to its allies, 
is easily identifiable, but it resonates more with a revanchist attitude rather than with 
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mercantilism. Namely, mercantilism, in its basic formulation, states the subservience 
of the economy to the state and its interests. As such, it is never indicated as policy 
compass for the administration’s global role. In the strategy, despite the call for a 
‘principled realism’, there is little reference to values or norms. The defence and the 
promotion of US interests are equaled to commercial interests, on whose altar pre-
vious policies, alliances, historical record, can be easily reversed and overturned.  
Since his election to the Presidency, Trump has strengthened ties with Is-
rael, even at the expense of upending the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, has 
stepped up cooperation with Russia to de-escalate the war in Syria, and has rein-
forced the alliance of the US with Sunni Gulf states against Iran. By doing so, as 
briefly noted, President Trump has strongly endorsed the Saudi-Emirati gambit to 
isolate Qatar, thereby contributing to a rapprochement between Qatar and non-
Arab regional players, first and foremost Turkey and Iran, who have supported Qa-
tar economically and have pledged to step up their military and defense coopera-
tion, should the need arise. Even most importantly, Trump has decertified the Ira-
nian nuclear deal, a deal whose making had taken over a decade of international ne-
gotiation and whose implementation was being assured by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. Although the decision to reverse the deal unilaterally did not cause 
its final demise (ICG 2017), it has triggered a chain reaction of negative conse-
quences. It has strengthened hardliners in Tehran, worsened the economic pro-
spects of the country and of the population that was eagerly awaiting for the lift of 
economic sanctions, diminished the credibility of the US commitment to interna-
tional agreements, and incentivized Iranian attempts to capitalize on its current in-
fluence in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen. It has also legitimized the Saudi stance in the 
changing regional balance of power vis-à-vis the Iranian one, taking an explicit 
stand in a regional highly polarized rivalry, something which is not consistent with a 
purely realist understanding of US foreign policy in the region. In part, the reversal 
of the JCPOA was ideologically linked to undo Obama’s legacy in international di-
plomacy (Ahmadian 2018). Beyond reversing the greatest foreign policy achieve-
ment of the Obama administration, Trump’s policy has been driven by three goals.  
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First, Trump has been intent on countering or pushing back Iran’s regional 
presence, through isolation and containment (Geranmayeh 2018).  
Second, it has tried to limit or halt the gains for Iran derived from the 
JCPOA, adding as reasons beyond ‘the flawed’ nature of the deal -never explored- 
the regional role of Iran as a destabilizing force. The Saudi narrative, depicting the 
Islamic Republic of Iran as exporting terrorism and instability throughout the re-
gion, unequivocally shifting the blame on Tehran and inflating the perceived threat 
has become the US line. To its regional role, Tehran has been accused of aggressive 
intentions linked to the development of its ballistic missile program. Both issues 
(i.e., Tehran’s regional role and the missile program) had been kept separate from 
the nuclear negotiations by the Obama administration and the international com-
munity, pertaining to different dossiers and blocking diplomatic negotiations on the 
nuclear program (Ahmadian 2018).  
Third, Trump has reinvigorated traditional alliances (Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE, but also Sisi’s Egypt), against Obama’s attempt at rebalancing, away from au-
tomatic alignment with Saudi Arabia and acting more as an interlocutor rather than 
its defender. 
This rapid overview of Trump’s foreign policy in the Middle East seems to 
suggest, as a preliminary assessment, that neither offshore balancing nor the so-
called ‘principled realism’ can encapsulate the range of erratic policy choices adopt-
ed by the US administration in the region. The two approaches -mercantilism and 
realism- emphasize the importance of the autonomy of the state, and argue against 
capture by lobbies or particularistic interests. On the one hand, offshore balancing 
is premised on the preservation of balance of power, the avoidance of the emer-
gence of new regional hegemons or the escalation of intra-regional tensions in key 
geopolitical areas. Both share a Realpolitik reasoning but do not completely overlap. 
On the other hand, mercantilism has greatly evolved over the last three centuries. 
From the 18th and 19th century, it focused on wealth as a means to power, on rela-
tive gains, on the importance of the trade balance, incentivizing the rise of exports 
vis-à-vis imports and of exports of manufactured goods (and imports of commodi-
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ties) (Drezner 2010). In the 20th century, nationalist economic policies traditionally 
advocated for by mercantilists, especially in times of crisis, either by emergent 
economies or by great powers in decline, came under the spotlight with the rise of a 
globalized economy, leading to a de facto analytical rejection by realist thinkers of 
mercantilist prescriptions (Ibid). In other words, the combination of two paradigms, 
realism and mercantilism, does not fit hand in glove. Over time, realists have by and 
large advocated liberal economic policies rather than nationalist and protectionist 
ones. 
Examples of such incoherence from a realist perspective include the inten-
sification of regional tensions and conflicts as a consequence of specific US stances. 
This occurred when Trump sided with the Saudi-Emirati axis against Qatar in May 
2017, leading not only to realignment between Turkey and Qatar, but to a split in 
the GCC and its potential break-up, with smaller GCC members as Kuwait and 
Oman trying to mediate the dispute. None of these policy turns were forecast by 
the US administration or sought after and their consequences, a deteriorating intra-
GCC stalemate and reinforcement of non-Arab regional powers in the Gulf, mostly 
Iran, could undermine US long-term regional stability priorities. Similarly, from the 
vantage point of ensuring regional stability as an offshore balancer, the unilateral 
withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran did not serve US purposes. More-
over, the overthrow of the JCPOA was premised on Iran’s behavior in issues non-
related to the nuclear program. These were used to justify a highly coercive attitude 
by the US intended at stirring domestic unrest and eventually leading to regime 
change, i.e., a revisionist approach and an anti-status quo goal. And yet, realism 
does capture some of the Trump policies in the region, if intended in broad terms, 
as inspired by laying emphasis on material power and national interests, as far away 
as possible from idealist conceptions of foreign policy or of inter-state relations. 
Some of its decisions seem however to have been inspired or motivated by mere 
economic and commercial interests, as Trump’s declaration at the Riyadh summit 
indicated, by referring to over 110 billion dollars’ worth of contracts with Saudi 
Arabia for arms’ imports.  
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Despite the inaccuracy of Trump’s claim - there was actually no deal, no 
contracts signed, but letters of interest by potential Saudi buyers, which, moreover, 
dated back from the Obama administration (Riedel 2017)-, linking his support of 
Saudi foreign policy to supposed commercial gains for the US military industry 
could be read as a mercantilist foreign policy, where however diplomacy and foreign 
policy are subjugated to commercial gains not for the state as a whole but for key 
lobbies, such as the industrial-military complex.  
Interestingly, the political capital acquired by Trump with Saudi Arabia or 
Israel after the move of the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a highly sym-
bolic gesture which has led to Palestinian protests, the deterioration of relations be-
tween Palestinian and Israeli leaders, failed to show an immediate advantage for the 
US. But subsequent events, such as the recent request to Saudi Arabia to increase 
oil production in the wake of sanctions against Iran and Venezuela (Al Monitor 
2018), or the change in the composition of military aid to Israel, where for the first 
time the Israeli army has been asked to buy more from US military industries rather 
than from domestic ones, thereby significantly increasing the cost of procurement 
(Even & Hadad 2018), might signal the desire to accumulate political capital with 
traditional allies, exerting leverage at other points in time when the need arises.  
Trump’s foreign policy in the Middle East represents a unique combina-
tion of mercantilism, realism, personalized politics that, most remarkably, is likely to 
be shaped by structural and contingent factors more than strategic and political in-
tentions. In other words, the combination between mercantilism, unprincipled real-
ism, personal politics is likely to further generate chaos as it follows no coherent set 
of guidelines or strategy. If disengagement form the MENA region had been on the 
radar for quite some time and had formulated as a goal at least already under the 
Obama presidency, the personalized realist mercantilism by Trump risks empower-
ing belligerent leaders in the region, from Saudi Arabia through Israel to Egypt, 
waging wars or intensifying repression of domestic dissent, while providing only 
sectoral benefits to selected US economic or industrial sectors, especially the indus-
trial-military one, devoid of any national strategic orientation. 
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